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Résumé / Abstract
En rapportant sa satisfaction vis-à-vis son travail ou toute autre
expérience, un individu ne communique pas le nombre d’unités d’utilité qu’il
ressent. Plutôt, conditionnellement à ses expériences antérieures, il exprime a
posteriori sa préférence relativement à d’autres emplois ou situations alternatives.
Cette nouvelle interprétation de la satisfaction révélée rend à la théorie
microéconomique son pouvoir explicatif tout en reconnaissant le rôle essentiel joué
par la différence entre la situation d’une personne et les opportunités. Les
différences a posteriori dans la richesse humaine sont les meilleurs prédicteurs de
la satisfaction révélée. Les modèles statiques de l’utilité relative et ceux d’utilité
subjective sont tous rejetés par les données, de même que le modèle économique où
la satisfaction de l’emploi est une mesure de la richesse humaine a posteriori. Le
modèle de choix a posteriori explique pourquoi dans les enquêtes une grande
majorité de personnes expriment leur bonheur ou leur satisfaction, pourquoi les
jeunes et les vieux ne réagissent pas aux différentielles de revenus courants et
pourquoi le passé joue davantage que la situation présente ou future.
By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an
individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he
expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on
acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job
satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the
eesential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available
opportunities. Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best
predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other
subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data,
as well as an “economic” model in which job satisfaction is a measure of
posterior human wealth. The “posterior choice” model readily explains why so
many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger
and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why
the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.
Mots Clés : Satisfaction à l’emploi, modèles d’utilité relative, modèle de choix
a posteriori
Keywords : Job satisfaction, Relative utility models, Posterior choice model
JEL : J28
1 Introduction
People often express judgments of satisfaction or dissatisfaction towards
their own past experience of a brand, a lm, their job, the incumbent
government, and even their whole life. What do these judgments mean
and how can we make sense of them for predicting important economic
behavior like sales of a new brand, strikes, quits, school enrollments,
electoral outcomes, and even suicides?
Since opinions are often much easier to collect than objective data,
the popularity of opinion surveys among marketing services, psycholo-
gists, political scientists and sociologists is hardly surprising. But a ma-
jority of economists are still reluctant to use this abundant data, with a
few notable exceptions (Hamermesh 1977, Freeman 1978, Borjas 1979,
and quite recently, Clark and Oswald 1994, 1996). They view personal
judgments of satisfaction and other subjective opinions as a black box
that should be opened only by psychologists and sociologists. But, on
the other hand, they are not happy with the stories told by the latter as
they contradict the accepted, and otherwise successful, theory of utility.
What do psychologists, sociologists and a few daring economists have
to say about self reported job satisfaction? First of all, they interpret
this judgment as a direct measure of the utility or well-being felt by the
respondent. Should this measure be ordinal or cardinal is an unsettled
question, but whatever position is taken on this issue, the sensitive prob-
lem of interpersonal utility comparisons has to be tackled. Once we make
these steps, we have no other choice than accepting the discomforting
story that money alone does not buy satisfaction. More than twenty
years ago, Duncan (1975) and Easterlin (1973, 1975) have provided de-
scriptive statistics showing that, under the above interpretation, raising
the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all. This nding
has been replicated on many occasions. For example, Scitovsky (1992)
reports for the U.S. that over a period of 25 years where per capita in-
come rose by 62%, \the proportion of people who consider themselves
very happy, fairly happy and not too happy has hardly changed at all".
These studies have also suggested that the individual's ranking in the
income distribution of an economy, or relative income, has a signicant
impact on the level of well-being. Easterlin (1995) provides a synthesis of
recent evidence. Partly as a result of the poor predictability of economic
factors, researchers have turned to psychological theories of \subjective
well-being" (SWB), that adopt \non economic" utility functions in which
enters some sort of discrepancy between objective conditions of life (e.g.,
income, consumption) and a subjectively dened reference. Under vari-
ous assumptions about the reference, SWB theories are consistent with
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the Duncan-Easterlin observations while the conventional economic view
is not.
Our rst objective in this paper is to reconsider the competing, eco-
nomic and non economic, interpretations of reported (job) satisfaction as
felt utility. We extend previous work by specifying lifetime utility, and a
semi-exible functional form which nests a variety of (broadly dened)
SWB hypotheses: relative utility (among others, Van Praag 1968, Van
de Stadt et alii 1985, Hamermesh 1977), social comparison (e.g., Veblen
1899, Duesenberry 1962, Clark and Oswald 1996), cognitive dissonance
(e.g., Festinger 1957, Gilad et alii 1987), disappointment (e.g., Loomes
and Sugden 1986), and loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). The
main result of our econometric tests on Canadian cross-sectional data is
that the parsimonious assumption of relative utility should be accepted,
and both the economic model and other SWB hypotheses rejected.
Our second objective is to specify an econometric model that beats
the benchmark of relative utility, and to restore the power of microeco-
nomic theory, by taking a life cycle's view of job's choice and by giving
a new ordinal interpretation of happiness and satisfaction judgments.
We achieve these two tasks in the paper. Specically, we argue that the
job satisfaction reported in questionnaires is always conditional on the
individual's having previously chosen and experienced that job. It is the
mere judgment that the respondent would now repeat his past choice
if he had to choose again. We view reported job satisfaction not as a
measure of felt utility, but as a potential choice conditional on past ex-
periences which may be simply called a posterior choice of own job. The
latter choice is conditional on available information at the time of the
survey including the \surprises" which occurred since the time of the
choice. Moreover, we maintain that communication in the form of re-
porting satisfaction or dissatisfaction in a questionnaire is fundamentally
an act, which reveals an ordinal preference exactly like the purchase of
an item would. The reason is that, if you wish to make yourself under-
stood by other persons with whom you communicate but who cannot feel
physically what you feel, you must convey messages that have an ordinal
value because only the latter will mean the same to all. The life cycle
model which we derive from this new interpretation in the paper is con-
sistent with the earlier ndings of Duncan and Easterlin but also makes
new stark predictions, conrmed by the data. It readily explains why so
many persons usually report themselves as happy or satised, why they
are typically more satised with their job than with their pay or with
the government; why the frequency of those reporting job satisfaction
increases (is U -shaped) with age; why job satisfaction negatively cor-
relates with voluntary quits and union aliation; why current earnings
2
discrepancies have hardly any inuence on job satisfaction in both the
younger and the older age-groups; and why past earnings discrepancies
weigh more heavily than current ones on job satisfaction. The posterior
choice model also demonstrates that reported job satisfaction has two
components, one of which is backward-looking and known with certainty,
and the other is forward-looking and based on a personal expectation.
Obviously, the weights of these two components change drastically over
the life cycle and this has interesting implications. Finally, in avoiding
the need to assume equivalence of scales of reported satisfaction or hap-
piness across individuals, we widen the range of qualitative data that
are amenable to economic analysis in such elds as job mobility, job
matching, individual responses to changing incentives and nonpecuniary
rewards and other sorts of human behavior (for other applications to
consumer choice, fairness and paradoxes to the theory of riskless choice,
see Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette 1996a, 1996b).
Section 2 introduces the theory of job satisfaction as felt utility with a
lifetime extension of the neoclassical utility model and a discussion of the
subjective well-being models. Section 3 develops the theory of reported
job satisfaction as a posterior choice. Section 4 introduces the data and
earnings functions that we use later to estimate reference earnings, earn-
ings discrepancies, and past earnings from cross-sectional data. Section 5
describes the econometric specications of the models and some related
estimation problems. Section 6 presents the estimates of reported job
satisfaction consistent with seven SWB assumptions, posterior choice,
and lifetime utility. Section 7 concludes.
2 Job satisfaction as felt utility: Theory
2.1 The Lifetime Utility Model
The standard microeconomic theory considers that individuals have a
denite lifetime indirect utility function:
U = U (H;u) , (1)
where U stands for lifetime utility, H for (human) wealth, and u is a
vector of non-pecuniary amenities, hours of work (eort) and utilities
from other spheres of life.
1
The interesting feature about studying job satisfaction rather than,
say, happiness about life is that (human) wealth acts in (1) as a poten-
1
Prices of goods and interest rates, which have no variability on cross-sectional
data, are not reported in equation (1).
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tially measurable subutility of an objective nature. This oers a unique
opportunity for testing alternative theories of utility in a direct fashion
as will be done here. What has been estimated in the literature, however,
is not equation (1) but a static approximation of it, like U = U (y; u),
in which y designates current earnings (net of education and training
costs). This static utility model is admittedly very coarse but it is easily
estimated on cross-section data.
The question arises whether the felt utility reported by an individ-
ual of given age is forward-looking, which is the way economists tend to
think about it (e.g., Hamermesh 1977). In such case, we should write
human wealth after age a as the present value of expected future earn-
ings, E
a
V
a
 y
a+1
+
y
a+2
1+r
+ ::: ; where r is the interest rate per period.
We would need an explicit model of earnings expectations as a function
of past magnitudes
2
. However, it is perhaps more intuitive to think of
someone expressing what he felt in the past as much as what he expects
in the future. This would become more obvious if subjects were asked to
report their satisfaction with the last play they saw (e.g., Levy-Garboua
and Montmarquette 1996b) because it would now be understood that
they have no intention of attending the same show once again even if
they liked it. Consequently, it may be preferable to use for an individual
at age a the following expression of his lifetime human wealth :
H
a

a
X
t=1
y
t
(1 + r)
t 1
+
E
a
V
a
(1 + r)
a
(2)
The rst term is the discounted sum of all past and current earnings.
It has the crucial property of being known with certainty by respon-
dents and, thus, does not rest on the latter's idiosyncratic way of form-
ing expectations. Equation (2) describes job satisfaction as the sum of
this backward-looking component
3
and the more conventional forward-
looking component. The weight of these two parts varies systematically
over the life-cycle : the forward looking part dominates for the younger
group, and the backward looking part dominates for the older group.
According to equation (2), the regression coecient of current earnings
2
This approach was adopted in an earlier version of the paper (Levy-Garboua and
Montmarquette 1994).
3
"Backward-looking" is a convenient but partly inappropriate expression. In equa-
tion (2), it describes a posterior forward-looking view of the known past and present,
an interpretation that truly anticipates our discussion of section 3. At this stage of
the analysis, it could still be argued alternatively that the past and the future should
both be discounted from the present period. Such ambiguity is one of the conceptual
diculties raised by the treatment of reported satisfaction as a direct measure of felt
utility. Whatever interpretation is chosen will be tested in section 6.3 but the latter
will, in fact, be more badly rejected than the former.
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should decrease with experience; this prediction is not supported by
the forward-looking utility model. This oers a very convenient way
to test which of these two interpretations is to be preferred as will be
done is section 6. Things are slightly more complicated, though, be-
cause the unobservable expected future earnings will be correlated with
current earnings. Training and deferred payment schemes will create a
downward bias on the coecient of current earnings in the earlier career
because current earnings will then be negatively correlated with future
earnings. Therefore, it seems wise for testing the theory to distinguish
at least three periods of life : (i) early career; (ii) mid-career; (iii) late
career. The relation of current earnings with job satisfaction is expected
to be inversely U -shaped across age groups.
The lifetime utility model (in anyone of its two versions) highlights
the basic inability of the standard economic approach to explain the
following stylized facts :
1. uniform economic growth does not increase reported happiness
and job satisfaction (among others, Easterlin (1973, 1975, 1995) and
Duncan (1975));
2. the frequency of reported job satisfaction typically increases with
age (this point will be conrmed by table 4);
3. according to a few studies (e.g., Clark 1993, Clark and Oswald
1996), women and lower-educated workers seem to be more satised with
their job although they receive lower wages on average.
All of these facts (the third set should be taken with more caution
than the rst two) are plainly contradicted by the lifetime utility model
4
,
although the two last refutations were concealed in previous discussions
by the widespread use of the theoretically unattractive static form of the
utility model.
2.2 Subjective well-being models
The basic refutation of the static and lifetime utility models has led
many social scientists to rely on alternative theories, further designated
as SWB models. The latter form a rather heterogeneous family, but they
can all be summarized by a modied utility function :
U = U(H;H

; u) (3)
Equation (3), which substitutes for (1), incorporates an additional ar-
gument H

that symbolizes some reference (human) wealth. The word
4
Uniform economic growth will raise current and future earnings in equation (2).
Under steady growth, job satisfaction should also be the greatest for younger gener-
ations. Finally, permanently higher wages should produce greater job satisfaction.
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\reference" wealth and earnings has received in the literature at least
three dierent meanings. Hamermesh (1977) considers market opportu-
nities to be the natural economic reference and describes it by the indi-
vidual's reservation (next best) human wealth. Theories of interdepen-
dent preferences, pioneered by Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949),
emphasize the comparison of one's wealth to that of other similar per-
sons. An ordinalist version of the theory has been recently applied to
job satisfaction by Clark and Oswald (1996), and a cardinalist version of
relative utility was suggested a long time ago by Van Praag (1968) and
his Dutch colleagues (a recent evidence is Van de Stadt, Kapteyn and
Van de Geer 1985), to construct subjective poverty scales. The theory
of interdependent preferences may be held either in a weak form or in
a strong form. The proposition that favorable and unfavorable compar-
isons, symmetrically, have an impact on satisfaction and dissatisfaction
judgments, tested by Clark and Oswald (1996), is the weak form. The
assessment that only unfavorable comparisons or envious feelings matter
determines the strong form (Brenner (1983))
5
. Lastly, social researchers
have pointed out that, in a dynamic setting, the most natural reference
for an individual is perhaps his own prior expectation of wealth. Cohen
and Axelrod (1984) argue that individuals adapt their preferences after
observing pleasant and unpleasant surprises, i.e. discrepancies between
expected utility and experienced utility. Loomes and Sugden (1986) con-
tend that the feelings of disappointment and elation arouse respectively
when expectations have not been met or have been superseded. Gilad,
Kaish and Loeb (1987) set the general form of utility functions consis-
tent with the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance. According to
the latter, initiated by Festinger (1957), people choose to believe that
they are satised in spite of a bad experience by ignoring the dissonant
information. It takes a \very" bad surprise to adjust to reality. Finally,
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) have explained many anomalies of risk-
5
Duesenberry (1962:32) clearly favored the strong form but eventually shifted to
the weak form in the formal statement of his theory: \The analysis of the forces
causing impulses to consume shows that these arise when an individual makes an
unfavorable comparison of his living standard with that of someone else. If these
impulses must be rejected, the individual is dissatised with his position. [...]. Con-
sequently, the dissatisfaction with his consumption standard which an individual must
undergo is a function of the ratio of his expenditures to those of people with whom
he associates.
Thus if C
i
is the consumption expenditure of one individual and U
i
is his utility
index, we may write U
i
= U
i
 
C
i
=
P

ij
C
j

where C
j
is the consumption of the
j
th
individual and 
ij
is the weight applied by the i
th
consumer to the expenditure
of the j
th
". The strong form of Duesenberry's theory is obtained by assuming that

ij
= 0 whenever C
j
 C
i
.
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less choice by their theory of loss aversion, where utility is concave for
gains and convex for losses, both measured from a reference point which
would often be one's initial position.
In most cases, the SWB models have not been presented in a readily
testable form. It is such a test that we wish to pursue here. We follow
common practice by restricting our investigation to a static utility, and
postpone the test of the lifetime utility model until section 6. Our em-
pirical strategy is to estimate reported job satisfaction by a semi-exible
functional form whose arguments are a value y

i
of current reference
earnings of individual i (age a is omitted), an appropriate function of
earnings discrepancy "
i
 y
i
 y

i
and control utility shifters. The chosen
functional form should also nest the standard quasi-linear static utility :
U
i
= 
i
+  y
i
, (4)
where  is a positive constant, and 
i
= + Z
i
 is a linear equation
of psycho-sociological factors including education, gender, the felt disu-
tility of work, dissatisfaction with marriage, dissatisfaction with health
and a number of individual taste-shifters. Aside from its simplicity, a
quasi-linear utility ensures that the unobserved value of job amenities
and unearned income enters into 
i
or an additive error component.
Since an equivalent of (4) is :
U
i
= 
i
+  y

i
+  "
i
; the simplest modied utility which nests the
standard utility is :
U
i
= 
i
+ 
1
y

i
+ 
2
"
i
, (5)
where 
1
and 
2
are allowed to be unequal. Equation (5) is a linear form
of the social comparison model when 0  
1
< 
2
, which boils down to
the pure relative utility model when 
1
= 0: However, many of the men-
tioned SWB models include non-linear eects of earnings discrepancies.
The following piece-wise linear form is a fairly exible way of introducing
nonlinearities while nesting equations (4) and (5) :
U
i
= 
i
+ 
1
y

i
+ 
2
"
i
+ 
3
D"
i
+ 
4
D
+
"
i
+ 
5
D
 
"
i
: (6)
D is a dummy variable equal to 1 when  
"
 "
i
< 0; that is when
the dierence between realized and reference wage is negative and smaller
or equal (in absolute terms) than a value assumed here proportional
to the standard error of the earnings discrepancies; D is equal to 0
otherwise. Similarly, D
+
is equal to 1 when "
i
> 
"
and 0 otherwise,
and D
 
is equal to 1 when "
i
<  
"
and 0 otherwise.  and  are
both positive but need not be equal. 
i
captures the direct eect of
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personal characteristics and other components of utility on self-reported
job satisfaction.
Figure 1 helps to visualize the specic functional forms of job satis-
faction with respect to earnings discrepancies embedded in equation (6),
holding reference earnings and other variables constant.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
3 Reported satisfaction as a posterior choice
Let us remark that you never ask someone whether he or she is satised
with something that he or she has not gotten or experienced before. So,
the satisfaction or dissatisfaction that someone reports, say, regarding
his job must be conditional on this person having chosen his job in the
past and had experience of it. At the moment an individual made his
or her particular choice, the choice itself could be seen as an expression
of satisfaction; some time later, when asked to express a judgment, this
judgment of satisfaction should then be interpreted as a potential act of
choice conditional on past experiences. So to speak, the prior choice of
a job manifests an expected satisfaction, while reporting satisfaction of
one's job reveals a kind of posterior choice. Surprisingly, these points
have gone unnoticed in previous studies of (job) satisfaction. Moreover,
remember that we always measure satisfaction as reported by respondents
in questionnaires. Their answer must have an ordinal value because an
outside observer (say the econometrician) would simply not understand
a cardinal response expressed in a subjective scale, and the purpose of
communication from one subject to another is obviously to make oneself
understood.
We now examine the implications of this new interpretation of re-
ported job satisfaction. An individual making the posterior choice of
his own job would be in the peculiar position of knowing what happened
until the present date. He would report satisfaction, i.e. conrm his own
past choices, if and only if, his (partly known) expected human wealth
was greater than his (partly known) alternatives.
Let J
a
be an ordinal index of job satisfaction at age a. We dene
8
<
:
J
a
= 1 if H
a
+ u > H

a
+ u

J
a
= 0 if H
a
+ u  H

a
+ u

;
(7)
where (u

)u designates the (reservation) value of non pecuniary deter-
minants of utility. The analysis is easily extended when more than two
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answers are allowed (as was the case in the survey we used), by consid-
ering several alternative answers in decreasing order of value. Assuming
a binary answer without loss of generality, we report (2) into (7) and
write the following condition for reporting job satisfaction:
J
a
= 1 i
a
X
t=1
y
t
  y

t
(1 + r)
t  1
+
E
a
V
a
  E
a
V

a
(1 + r)
a
+ u  u

> 0: (8)
Since the past is known with certainty, the individual's risk attitude
does not aect the backward looking part of this expression. Thus, the
posterior choice model predicts that reported satisfaction solely depends
on discrepancies without being in contradiction with accepted economic
theory.
The theory also predicts two of the three stylized facts spelled out
in section 2. Uniform economic growth will not make anyone happier
because it will raise all opportunities in equal proportions. The fre-
quency of reported job satisfaction typically increases with age because
rational individuals always choose the best job and, under rational ex-
pectations, they cannot be systematically wrong in the long run. The
backward-looking component of expression (8) is thus likely to be per-
manently positive after reaching a sucient number of years, while the
forward-looking component converges towards zero. The upward-sloping
relationship of job satisfaction with age is not necessarily monotonic,
though, and it may be U-shaped. Contrary to Hamermesh (1977), this
result does not require any job specicity of human investments. On the
other hand, the model does not predict any systematic eect of sex or ed-
ucation on job satisfaction, ceteris paribus. Being a man or a university
graduate will tend to increase earnings permanently in all occupations,
and this will not aect the sign of (8) unless it has a dierential eect
on the non-pecuniary value of jobs.
But the posterior choice model has even more to say. A stylized
fact of previous studies of satisfaction judgments (including ours) is that
responses are typically concentrated in the upper segments of the satis-
faction scale (e.g., Campbell 1981, Krahn and Lowe 1988). Most people
usually report that they are happy or pretty happy! This well-known
fact has often been overlooked on the ground that the satisfaction in-
dex is an arbitrary measure of SWB. Although this argument may not
be quite convincing (why should researchers bother about satisfaction
judgments if they are noise), it can no longer be addressed to us if we
interpret reported satisfaction as a meaningful choice. Indeed, the ra-
tionality assumption implies that, under certainty, individuals always be
9
satised with choices which they deliberately made. A corollary is that
respondents would be less satised on average with experiences out of
their control. A good instance is oered by the surveys on the politi-
cal popularity of governments in democratic regimes. As a little half of
respondents did not support the incumbent government in the polls, it
is not surprising that so little consensus is usually found in these judg-
ments. Other convincing evidence is the fact that respondents report
greater overall job satisfaction than pay satisfaction. The mean scores
(standard deviations) found by Clark and Oswald (1996, data appendix)
on a 1-7 scale were respectively 5.50 (1.51) and 4.49 (1.95). A suggested
interpretation is that individuals control their job as a whole better than
their pay, because choosing a job is a package deal whose single elements,
like pay, cannot be freely and separately chosen.
Lastly, it should be noted that the \posterior choice" underlies no
real decision, but it does point to some real decision. Omitting the non
pecuniary value of jobs for simplicity, equations (7) and (8) indicate that
reported job satisfaction means: H
a
 H

a
> 0, whereas the decision to
stay in the job is governed by: E
a
V
a
  E
a
V

a
> 0. Neither of these
two conditions implies the other, but the posterior choice of job and
the ex ante choice of staying correlate (Freeman 1978; Akerlof, Rose
and Yellen 1988). One can be more accurate and derive from (8) the
two following implications: (i) those individuals who suered a null or
negative discrepancy in their past career's value (i.e.,
a
P
t=1
y
t
 y

t
(1+r)
t 1
 0)
and now report job satisfaction intend to stay; (ii) those who enjoyed
a positive discrepancy in their past career's value and now report job
dissatisfaction intend to quit, unionize, or do whatever is best in order
to improve their future career. The foregoing analysis demonstrates
that job satisfaction cannot be a consequence, but is rather a cause,
of job turnover and union aliation. Hence the common practice of
including tenure and union aliation among the explanatory variables
of job satisfaction (e.g., Borjas 1979, Freeman 1978; Clark and Oswald
1996) is not warranted under this new interpretation.
4 The data and earnings functions
In a survey conducted by Statistics Canada in 1986, several thousand in-
dividuals across Canada answered the following question : What is your
level of satisfaction (with categorical answers) with your job or principal
activity? The survey also contains information about the respondent's
wage over the last twelve months, age, gender, level of education, years
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of experience, number of weeks (part time or full time) employed over
the last 12 months, socioeconomic work status, linguistic ability, region
of residence, country of birth, marital status, religion status, and the
level of satisfaction concerning the respondent's health, leisure and mar-
ital situation. These variables, described in Table 1, account for factors
aecting the level of satisfaction and/or the determinants of earnings.
The sample of 2,600 observations consists of individuals who all declared
nonzero wages for the period considered and were not self-employed.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
In order to estimate past earnings, reservation earnings and earnings
discrepancies, we ran separate earnings regressions for the following age-
groups : 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45 and over. Our initial justication for
partitioning the sample is that we can test the crucial prediction that
the coecient of current earnings (discrepancies) should be inversely U -
shaped with age. An additional motivation will appear in subsection
5.2. Another point of departure from previous studies (e.g., Hamer-
mesh 1977, Clark and Oswald, 1996) is that we do not use the log earn-
ings specication popularized by Mincer (1974). We choose to regress
earnings directly (see (12)) because the causative latent variable is hu-
man wealth (human wealth discrepancy), which is additive in earnings
(earnings discrepancies). If we had estimated the Mincerian equation
log y = log y

+ v, the generated earnings discrepancy would have been
: "  y   y

= y (1  e
  v
). Since the latter is proportional to earn-
ings, we would have introduced a spurious correlation of y

and ". This
might be partly responsible for the weak inuence of reference earnings
on job satisfaction found in previous studies, holding the discrepancy
term constant.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present for each group the OLS es-
timates with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Column (2) in-
troduces a smaller number of explanatory variables than column (1), for
reasons that will become apparent in subsection 5.2. Many variables are
statistically signicant with their expected signs. In particular, we noted
that men are better paid than women across all age-groups, and that the
level of education is an important determinant of wage. The experience
variables are important in the 25-34 age-group, but the worker's socioe-
conomic work status and his part time work status aect all age-groups.
For the 35-44, the worker's region of residence and religion status also
played a signicant role.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
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5 Econometric specications and problems
5.1 Job satisfaction as felt utility
In principle, equation (6) can be estimated with either one of the three
main denitions of reference earnings that we mentioned in subsection
2.2. However, we argue that both reservation earnings and expected
earnings can be hardly distinguished empirically from comparison earn-
ings. It should rst be clear that the earnings predicted for a given
individual from a random sample in cross-section serve as a good econo-
metric estimate for his comparison earnings. The same gure should
also come close to that individual's reservation earnings because the va-
riety of earnings which can be observed from the sample simulate the
market opportunities that would be revealed by his search for the best
oer. Finally, as far as an econometrician who cannot rely on panel data
will be happy enough to estimate the expected wage from cross-section,
it will make a decent econometric guess for the individual's expected
earnings. Therefore, all three denitions of reference earnings are close
to the age-specic earnings predicted by a statistical earnings function.
The earnings discrepancy is then simply the estimated residual of an
earnings function. Note for instance that Hamermesh (1977) and Clark
and Oswald (1996) have both adopted the same \statistical" method
while using a dierent concept of reference earnings. Keeping this in
mind, we shall be able to test nine utility models against the null, which
we simply call the \statistical" model. Moreover, these models are par-
tially nested and this will permit selecting the best one, i.e. the most
parsimonious non rejected model. All of the felt utility models of job
satisfaction which will be tested are summarized in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Although Table 3 and Figure 1 describe the same reality, they have
quite dierent expositional virtues. Figure 1 helps us to distinguish SWB
models at rst glance. On the other hand, Table 3 is a convenient frame
for visualizing which model is nested in which.
5.2 The construction of lifetime earnings and refer-
ence earnings from cross-section data
A full test of the lifetime utility and posterior choice models requires
knowledge of past earnings and reservation earnings. A static version
of these would be empirically undistinguishable from the economic and
relative utility models mentioned in Table 3. Although panel data could
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solve this problem, we present here a shortcut method which permits the
construction of lifetime earnings from cross-section data. Most surveys
being of the latter type, we believe it is important for the progress of
future research to suggest a cheap and operational way of beating the
static benchmark.
Ex ante job decisions are taken under uncertainty and surprises must
inevitably occur with the passage of time. Our empirical strategy for the
construction of past reservation earnings is to reconstitute individual sur-
prises econometrically. We acknowledge the fact that earnings surprises
originate in the release of new information about the productivity of
self and others and that one part of it correlates with life-cycle variables
whose exact value is unknown in youth but gets determined sequentially.
We divided the past and present in three periods for reasons mentioned
below. Each period is characterized by a dierent stock of information,
the amount of available information increasing over time. Periods might
be of unequal length both within and between age-groups. The rst pe-
riod is simply around school-leaving age. For most individuals, relevant
information is then restricted to education level, gender and national-
ity. Rational career expectations should be based on just that, and the
predictable returns to experience. Period 1 reservation earnings have
been estimated from that information only and the coecients of the
corresponding earnings functions appear in column 2 of Table 2. While
information is minimal at school-leaving age, it is maximal currently,
and a natural denition of currently available information is given by
the complete list of variables which enter the age-specic earnings func-
tions reported in Table 2.
6
Current reservation earnings have been calculated by imputing to
each individual observed values of the latter variables and taking the
coecients found in column 1. Since information is acquired sequentially,
this methodology can also be used to estimate the reservation earnings of
an intermediate period in which the worker has a good idea of the factors
which aect earnings but draws his comparison from a heterogeneous
6
The statistical variables which are meant to capture the release of new infor-
mation through the life-cycle appear in column 1. They include measures of the
time allocated to work (JOBWKS, WPART, LTDS), place of residence (ONT), mar-
ital status (MARRD, DIVOR), health (HEDS), religion status (NOREL), and socio-
economic status (WSSP, WSTF). We are conscious that it is not common practice in
the human capital literature to include socio-economic status in the earnings func-
tion since it is, at least in part, a choice variable. But the aim pursued here is not to
obtain consistent estimates of the returns to education and experience. It is rather
to get a close econometric simulation of an individual's reference earnings by taking
the mean earnings of a sample of \similar" persons. Presumably, age and broadly
dened elements of socio-economic attainment are basic indicators of similarity with
respect to job.
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sample. Consequently, period 2 reservation earnings have been simulated
by taking the coecients of column 1 and attributing to each worker the
age-specic average value of the variables, listed in column 1, which
remain unknown by the workers at that time.
7
Having thus computed the three period reservation earnings
 
y^
1;
y^
2;
y^
3

for every individual (denoting the school-leaving period by 1 and the cur-
rent period by 3), we now turn on to the estimation of own earnings in
the same periods (y
1
, y
2
, y
3
). The end-period earnings, y
3
; are currently
observed in the sample. As for the remaining two past periods, we con-
sistently dene :
y
2
= y^
3
; y
1
= y^
2
, (9)
from the assumption that the updating of an individual's opportunities
with experience follows his discovery of ever more complete information
about his personal situation. Another way of justifying (9) is to say that
an individual's reference earnings in any period but the rst one should
be his own earnings one period back.
Cross-sectional estimates for past (reservation) earnings should be
corrected for the spurious eect of experience between the period in the
past and the period of the survey. Taking age-group-specic earnings
and job satisfaction functions allows us to control for much of this eect
by addition of a constant term. The further introduction of experience
(EXPER) among the explanatory variables of the job satisfaction equa-
tion produced no signicant result and was eventually abandoned. This
brings another motivation for splitting the sample by age-group.
Finally, we consider four successive periods in the past for the lifetime
utility model by application of equation (9) one period back :
J
i
= + Z
i
 + '
1
y^
1;i
+ '
2
y^
2;i
+ '
3
y^
3;i
+ '
4
y
3;i
+ &
i
; (10)
The posterior choice model is specied with just the three periods in
the past :
J
i
= + Z
i
 +  
1
"^
1i
+  
2
"^
2i
+  
3
"^
3i
+ &
i
, (11)
with "^
3i
= y
3i
  y^
3i
; "^
2i
= y^
3i
  y^
2i
; "^
1i
= y^
2i
  y^
1i
.
If job satisfaction is partly backward-looking, it is expected that the
coecients of earnings in (10) and the coecients of earnings discrepan-
cies in (11) decrease over time :
7
This concerns all the variables except gender, education level, nationality and
experience (and the square).
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'1
> '
2
> '
3
> '
4
;
 
1
>  
2
>  
3
.
In both equations (10) and (11), the error term &
i
captures the
forward-looking part of human wealth (discrepancy), unobserved vari-
ables and measurement errors. Since the present value of future life-
time earnings declines with experience, the variance of the error term
in equations (10) and (6) must also decline with experience if reported
job satisfaction is to be interpreted as felt utility. Consequently, all
our regressions will be corrected for heteroskedasticity. The foregoing
analysis must be adapted to the posterior choice model described by
equation (11). As a matter of fact, the present value of future lifetime
earnings discrepancies would only decline with experience if the latter
were positively correlated, and we know that this will frequently, but not
necessarily, happen. So, heteroskedasticity may once more be a problem.
5.3 The problem of using generated regressors
Past earnings and earnings discrepancies, which enter as explanatory
variables in the job satisfaction equations, are estimates drawn from age-
group-specic earnings functions. For instance, the earnings discrepancy
"
i
is obtained as the residual of :
y
i
=W
i
+ "
i
; (12)
in which it is assumed thatW
0
i
is a set of exogenous variables independent
of "
i
.
Ideally, we want to estimate jointly the determinants of job satis-
faction and (reference) earnings. The presence, however, of a discrete
variable in the job satisfaction equation and, the additional diculty of
dealing with unobserved past earnings for the posterior choice and life-
time utility models convert a simple computational problem into a rather
complex one. An alternative is to consider two-stage estimators. Unfor-
tunately, as shown by Pagan (1984, 1986), McAleer and McKenzie (1991)
among others, generally in the context of linear models, these two-stage
and related estimators could have severe limitations including eciency
losses. In some cases, inconsistency could result for nonlinear models.
All models considered here are vulnerable on that last account, but one
can expect to improve consistency by assuming that E (&
i
"
i
) = 0 (also an
identifying restriction for some models). This weak exogeneity assump-
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tion
8
presumes that the unobserved determinants of earnings should be
uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of job satisfaction. Such
assumption should be veried by discrepancy models inasmuch unob-
served determinants of earnings, like ability, have an equal eect on ref-
erence earnings and thus do not aect the future earnings discrepancies
which form the major component of S
i
. On the other hand, it is more
problematic if the true model is the economic model (in either static,
or lifetime version), the relative utility, or the social comparison model
(in either weak or strong form). Moreover, the above assumption might
be invalidated by the presence of job specic investments and eciency
wage incentives.
Parametric two-step estimators substitute for the latent regressors in
(6), (10) and (11), their least square estimates
y^

=W (W
0
W )
 1
W
0
y = P
W
y

and "^ = (y   y^) from the earnings equa-
tion (12).
Specically, for the posterior choice model (11), we obtain after some
manipulations :
J
i
= + Z
i
 +  
1
(y^
2;i
  y^
1;i
) +  
2
(y^
3;i
  y^
2;i
) +  
3
(y
3;i
  y^
3;i
) + 
i
;
with the composite error 
i
:

i
= &
i
+ 
1
 
v
1
  r
1
+ P
w
1;
i
"
1;i

+ 
2
 
v
2
  r
2
+ P
w
2;
i
"
2;i

+ 
3
P
w
3;i
"
3;i
:
(13)
The v and r are additional error terms due to our estimates of the
observed and reservation earnings in periods 2 and 1 based on current
data (period 3). Under the null, H
0
:  
j
= 0 for all j
0
s, the two-step
procedure yields consistent and ecient estimates. For  
j
6= 0, the error
term is non-spherical causing not only an eciency problem, but some
parameter estimates might be inconsistent in the context of a discrete
dependent variable. Some corrections for the heteroskedasticity problem
will be proposed, and likelihood ratio tests will be used for statistical
inferences.
Comparable specications can be derived for the lifetime utility, and
static SWB models by substituting y^ for y

and "^ for " into equation (10)
and (6). In the previous empirical literature on job satisfaction, this
problem of generated regressors has been completely ignored.
8
See Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) for a discussion of weak exogeneity.
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6 Empirical results on job satisfaction
Our estimation of equations (6), (10) and (11) rests on an ordered probit
model
9
to account for the categorical nature of the dependent variable.
10
Let J
i
be the observed, ordinal satisfaction variable that has three possi-
ble outcomes. J
i
is related to the latent variable U
i
by a set of constants
or thresholds such that :
J
i
= 0 if U
i
 
0
;
= 1 if 
0
< U
i
 
1
;
= 2 if 
1
< U
i
:
(14)
This model implies that the probability of obtaining an observation
with J
i
= 1 is :
Prob (J
i
= 1) = F ((
1
 X
0
i
)=w
i
)  F ((
0
 X
0
i
)=w
i
) ;
where F is the cumulative normal distribution function and `w
i
' is the
individual specic standard deviation. The latter is either 1 for all i
(homoskedasticity), or, to account for heteroskedasticity, w
i
which adds
no new parameter, or e

0
w
i
for multiplicative heteroskedasticity adding
an additional parameter vector 
0
. Similar expressions can be found for
the other observed J
i
values. When an intercept, ; is included in the
equation for U
i
, identication is achieved by setting 
0
= 0.
The three categories for the dependent variable job satisfaction, JOBS,
range from the lowest to the highest level of satisfaction : \totally and
rather displeased", \rather satised" and \fully satised". The per-
centages of observations in each category for the overall sample of 2600
observations are respectively : 9.38%, 43.12%, 47.50%. High levels of job
satisfaction are not unusual in these surveys [see Krahn and Lowe (1988)]
and is predicted by the posterior choice model.
In Table 4, we present the level of satisfaction by age-groups. It can
be seen that the proportion of fully satised individuals increases with
age as predicted by the same model.
9
The ordered probit model is presented in Maddala (1983) and was rst estimated
by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). Greene (1995, 480) discusses the technical details
of integrating the heterosckedasticity in the basic model.
10
The discreteness of the statistical measure of reported job satisfaction conforms
well with the conventional and unconventional (eg. Hamermesh 1977, Clark 1993)
theories of ordinal utility. Defendors of a cardinalist conception must face the problem
of converting an ordinal statement onto a cardinal scale. They solve it by asking
respondents to evaluate their feelings on a detailed Likert-type scale (for instance,
Michalos (1985) uses a 7-point scale: terrible=1,..., delightful=7). Psychologists
usually treat the stated rank as a continuous variable. Van de Stadt et al (1985)
use the more sophisticated information maximization argument of Van Praag (1968).
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[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Analyzing the frequency data between the level of satisfaction and the
level of education, we reject the independence of the two variables for the
15-24 (p-value = 0.036) and the 35-44 (p-value = 0.068) age-groups. Here
the level of satisfaction appears to increase with the level of education,
a result coherent with the lifetime utility model. In the posterior choice
framework, such dependence might be due to job rationing which would
thus decrease with education level in these age groups. The independence
between the level of satisfaction and gender of the respondent is never
rejected as predicted by the posterior choice model. These two results
are at variance with the recent ndings of Clark and Oswald (1996) and
Clark (1993) on British data, which seems to imply that job tastes do not
systematically dier by education and gender. The lack of robustness
of these eects leaves little substance to ad hoc determinations of job
satisfaction in comparison with discrepancy factors.
6.1 Test of SWB models:
We obtained ordered probit estimates for all the felt utility models. The
results respect the specicity of each model (in terms of constrained
coecients)
11
and the ordered probits were corrected for multiplicative
heteroskedasticity with the years of experience variable, EXPER
12
. The
rst important nding is that, with only one exception, the statistical
model, or null hypothesis, cannot be rejected in the young (15-24) and
older (45+) age groups. This cannot be accommodated under a static
interpretation of utility, but corroborates the (partly) backward looking
nature of satisfaction and the presence of training and other deferred
payment schemes in early career. For space reasons, we do not report
these results which are available on request.
Moreover, the only exception for which the likelihood ratio test rejects
the statistical model in favor of the loss aversion model (p-value = 0.012)
concerns the 15-24 age-group. For that case, the coecients 
2
; 
3
; 
4
;

5
are all signicant but with the wrong sign, except for 
3
:
11
For example, for the loss aversion model, the proportional factor xing the range
of each dummy variable is set to
_
 = 1:5 for the negative earnings discrepancies while
 = 1. On the other models  =  = 1. These values yield a sucient number
of observations for all categories. Dierent values were tried without modifying the
results.
12
EXPER is a variable used in the rst stage of the estimation procedure and has
a relatively large variance. Dierent variables and a combination of variables were
also tried without improving the correction given by EXPER.
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Results for the 25-34 and 35-44 age-groups, reported in Tables 5a
and 5b respectively, are less negative.
[Insert Table 5A about here.]
In the 25-34 age group, likelihood ratio tests indicate that all felt util-
ity models are preferred to the restricted log likelihood associated with
the null with p-values less than 1%. However, all economic and SWB
models are not equally good. A simple t-test rejects the assumption that

1
= 
2
and accepts 
1
< 
2
, but a likelihood ratio test rejects any dier-
ence between the two models
13
. In turn, the unrestricted log likelihoods
of the social comparison (weak form), the cognitive dissonance II, the
disappointment-elation and the loss aversion models are statistically no
dierent from the restricted log likelihood of the parsimonious relative
utility model. The loop is closed to favor the relative utility model when
we note that the disappointment-elation model is preferred to the re-
stricted social comparison (strong form) model (p-value = 0.0064), and
the cognitive dissonance II model is preferred to the restricted cognitive
dissonance I model (p-value= 0.00075). In the relative utility model,
14
a
positive (negative) discrepancy will positively (negatively) inuence the
utility.
[Insert Table 5B about here.]
In the 35-44 age-group, only the economic model, the relative utility
model and the social comparison model (weak form) are preferred to
the null. These results are obtained from likelihood ratio tests with p-
values less than or equal to 5%. Again, the unrestricted log likelihood of
social comparison (weak form) model is statistically no dierent from the
restricted log likelihood of the economic and the relative utility model.
The relative utility model remains the preferred model.
It is also possible to evaluate each SWB utility function for its own
sake. Even if we restrict attention to the results reported in tables 5A
and 5B for the intermediate age groups, the nonlinearities implied by
cognitive dissonance II (
5
> 0), disappointment/elation (
3
> 0), and
loss aversion (
2
> 0) are strongly rejected by a Student test and the
coecients are insignicant with the wrong sign, most of the time. Such
13
The loglikelihoods of the economic model are reported in ** of Tables
5A and 5B.
14
The relative utility model is empirically undistinguishable from the dierential
satisfaction hypothesis of Hamermesh (1977), and from the surprise model of Cohen
and Axelrod (1984) although earlier discussion has shown that the use of generated
regressors may raise less problems if one of the latter models is the true one.
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refutations do not occur for the other models, although some coecients
may be insignicant.
To summarize, all of the static utility models are rejected against
the null (which simply relates job satisfaction to statistical determinants
of taste like gender and education) in the younger and in the older age
groups. In the two intermediate age-groups, a simple discrepancy model
fares better than the null and cannot be rejected against any other SWB
hypothesis. However, the conventional economic model relating job sat-
isfaction to earnings cannot be ruled out, at this stage, in the 35-44
age-group.
It was mentioned earlier that the use of generated regressors can-
not throw doubt on the test when the theory is to be rejected. There-
fore, social comparison (in weak and strong form), cognitive dissonance
(I and II), disappointment-elation, and loss aversion do not appear to
be promising tracks for understanding job satisfaction in view of the
complication added by these theories. Of course, some of these theo-
ries are perhaps better suited to the analysis of choices under risk and
other domains of behavior for which they were primitively designed.
Disappointment-elation is a case at hand. Our claim is simply that none
of the more complicated utility functions involving discrepancy terms
that have been suggested in the literature is a better predictor of job
satisfaction than a linear function of earnings discrepancy. Nor is the
conventional economic model.
6.2 Test of the posterior choice model:
Table 6 presents the results of the posterior choice model for all age-
groups. We rst note, once more, that it does not perform better than
the statistical model in the 15-24 and 45+ age-groups, but this is now
consistent with the lifetime interpretation (see the discussion in 2.1).
Also predicted by this model, the coecient of the current earnings dis-
crepancy b"
3
is inversely U - shaped and the peak is attained by the 25-34
age-group. The same observations could have been made from tables
5A and 5B about relative utility models, but were not predicted by the
latter. In order to make a crucial empirical distinction between both
interpretations, it is necessary to look at the coecients of past earnings
discrepancies, "^
1
and "^
2
. The fact that they appear with the correct sign,
are also signicant in the intermediate age groups (at the 5% level in the
25-34 age group and at the 10% level in the 35-44 age group), and follow
the inverse U -shaped pattern across age-groups, is highly supportive of
our new interpretation. An even more decisive argument is supplied by
the log likelihood test: in the middle age-groups, the unrestricted loglike-
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lihood of the posterior choice model is statistically signicantly greater
(p values=0.0069 and 0.0219 in the 25-34 and 35-44 age-groups respec-
tively) than the restricted log likelihood of the relative utility model.
It seems to be the rst time that a new model has been able to beat
the benchmark of simple discrepancy theories! Furthermore, this result
has been obtained in spite of the presumably great imprecision of the
cross-section estimates for past earnings discrepancies, which drives the
related coecients towards zero.
The ranking of the three coecients of past and current earnings dis-
crepancies provides new strong evidence in favor of the posterior choice
model. In conformity with theoretical predictions, it is found that a
discrepancy's eect on reported job satisfaction is the greater the more
distant it was experienced in the past. This pattern is exactly observed
in three age-groups, and the coecients of "^
1
and "^
3
are truly apart.
The only violation concerns an age group (15-24) for which the predic-
tion was not reliable for two reasons: the incidence of human investments
and other deferred payment schemes in early career, and the \thinness
of past" for recent school-leavers. As it is, the set of results should be
quite convincing because it runs counter the loose intuition that more
remote events should be discounted.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
One interesting feature of the posterior choice model is the theoret-
ical possibility of retrieving, from the coecients of the time varying
earnings discrepancy variables, the rate of interest (or time preference)
for the average individual in our sample. Unfortunately, the periods
that correspond to the three estimated discrepancies are not dened
with any precision, so that any calculation is highly speculative without
panel data. The main impression that emerges from the data, at this
stage, is that the average discount rate is substantially greater in the
early career than later on.
All the estimations, for both the felt utility models and the posterior
choice model, were done correcting for multiplicative heteroskedasticity
of the second stage estimation with the experience variable, EXPER. The
coecient estimates of this variable are always negative and statistically
signicant for some regressions (see Table 5B and 6). The negative value
suggests that the residual variance in the level of reported job satisfaction
decreases with the labor market experience of the individuals. This result
is consistent with the fact that the forward looking part of human wealth
discrepancy (see equation (8)) is essentially in the residual and decreases
with experience on average as the span of the remaining working life
decreases.
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6.3 Test of the lifetime utility model:
We conclude this empirical section by showing the ordered probit esti-
mates of equation (10) in table 7. This provides an extended test of the
conventional economic model by substituting lifetime past earnings for
current earnings. If the lifetime utility model were true, all coecients
of earnings should take positive and decreasing values from the past to
the present. Our results plainly contradict these predictions: the coe-
cient of y^
1
is always negative (signicant at the 10% level in the 35-44
age group), and the coecients of y^
2
, y^
3
, y
3
exhibit a U -shaped pattern.
Hence, there is no way to rescue the conventional economic model by
adding some dynamics.
It is possible to rewrite the deterministic part of equation (11), i.e.
the posterior choice model, into equation (10) since the earnings discrep-
ancies are simple combinations of y^
1
, y^
2
, y^
3
, and y
3
. One gets:
 
1
(y^
2
  y^
1
) +  
2
(y^
3
  y^
2
) +  
3
(y
3
  y^
3
)
=   
1
y^
1
+ ( 
1
   
2
) y^
2
+ ( 
2
   
3
) y^
3
+  
3
y
3
;
which must be juxtaposed to: '
1
y^
1
+ '
2
y^
2
+ '
3
y^
3
+ '
4
y
3
:
The pattern of coecients observed in table 7 emerges from the
theoretical prediction that  
1
>  
2
>  
3
> 0. Thus we should have
'
1
< 0; '
2
> '
3
> 0; and '
4
> 0. Moreover, we check that '
4
=  
3
by comparing the related coecients from tables 6 and 7. Other com-
parisons, and especially '
1
=   
1
, are obviously more fuzzy but of the
same order of magnitude.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In summary, the lifetime utility model is unambiguously rejected in
favor of the posterior choice model.
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7 Concluding remarks
A new theory should be preferred to the conventional wisdom when it
predicts more facts, rests on fewer ad hoc assumptions, and when the
prior model is consistently rejected by the data against the new one. On
all these accounts, considerable evidence found in this paper indicates
that, when someone reports his satisfaction with something that he has
15
We may add a little spice to this conclusion by noticing that both models fare
equally well in terms of loglikelihood (which is no surprise).
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experienced, he does not really communicate the number of utils that
he felt, but rather states his own preference for that thing over his best
alternative conditional on what he knows and expects of both, at this
time.
In simple words, reporting one's satisfaction is the judgment that
one would now repeat one's past experience if one had to choose again.
Under certainty and stable preferences, one would always be satised
with an unconstrained and deliberate decision made in the past. It is
merely the occurrence of surprises and constraint changes which makes
the posterior preference deviate from the prior.
This new interpretation does not invalidate the empirical ndings of
psychological and sociological research on the subject, which emphasized
the role of discrepancies between objective conditions and a reference
on reported satisfaction. It is exactly what the new theory predicts.
However, this important result does not require utility to be relative and
comparable across persons, because choice and preference are obviously
relative and ordinal concepts. Furthermore, the new theory characterizes
the reference from which discrepancies are appreciated as the individual's
best alternative at the time he makes a satisfaction judgment. This
comes closest to the pioneering analysis of Hamermesh (1977), but we
believe Festinger (1954) had essentially the same reference in mind in
his illuminating theory of social comparison processes.
16
Recognition of the intertemporal dimension of satisfaction judgments
signicantly improves the empirical content of the theory and illuminates
several hidden aspects of human behavior. For instance, older persons
appear less sensitive to current discrepancies, and discrepancies expe-
rienced in the remote past have far greater weight on job satisfaction
judgments than what happens at present. These two predictions are
reminiscent of the fact that wisdom comes with age and that traumas
suered during childhood have quite persistent eects on human sat-
isfaction. The observation that current earnings discrepancies have a
negligible, and perhaps negative, eect on the job satisfaction of young
workers is another striking testimony that individuals have a long plan-
16
Festinger (1954) clearly states (p.121): \Corollary III A: Given a range of possible
persons for comparison, someone close to one's own ability or opinion will be chosen
for comparison;" and (p. 120): \Corollary II B: When an objective, non-social basis
for the evaluation of one's ability or opinion is readily available persons will not
evaluate their opinions or abilities by comparison with others".
These two corollaries put together indicate that, in Festinger's mind, comparison
would be a proxy for such information when the latter was not available or too
costly; and thus comparison with most similar persons would be a way of evaluating
one's best alternative. Festinger suggested an information-based argument for social
comparison, not a theory of interdependent preferences.
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ning horizon and consciously make on-the-job investments. Such a result
is remarkable because studies using training data have after been unable
to nd consistent evidence of workers paying for their training through
lower starting wages. The test of a life-cycle model on cross-sectional
data may attract some suspicion on our results and the study needs to
be replicated on longitudinal data. On the other hand, that limitation
forced us to design an easily replicable methodology for partially recov-
ering past earnings discrepancies from cross section.
Straightening up the interpretation of satisfaction judgments restores
the power of microeconomic theory and should thus make economists
feel less reluctant to exploit the wealth of such qualitative data in econo-
metric studies of job mobility, job matching, union membership, rms'
compensation policies, and many other sorts of human behavior.
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Table 1
Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Symbols Definitions Means
(Standard Errors)
JOBS Level of job satisfaction :
- totally and rather displeased 0.0938
- rather satisfied 0.4312
- fully satisfied 0.4750
WAGE Wage income for the last 12 months (in $000) 22.41
(12.7)
SEXM Gender of the respondent :
  male = 1; female = 0 0.5408
ED08 Education :
  8 years or less = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0658
ED13- Education :
  9-13 years = 1; 0 otherwise 0.4796
ED13+ Education :
  13+ years without university degree = 1; 0 otherwise 0.3034
EDUN Education :
  university = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1512
Table 1 - cont’d
Symbols Definitions Means
(Standard Errors)
EXPER Years of experience 13.8488
(11.55)
JOBWKS Number of weeks employed over the last 12 months 47.79
(10.14)
WPART Over these weeks :
  working mostly part time = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1031
WSSP Socioeconomic work status :
  professional, high level management = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1327
WSTF Work status :
  specialized, technician, supervisor = 1; 0 otherwise 0.4558
WSNS Work status :
  semi and unskilled = 1; 0 otherwise 0.4035
WFFL Work status :
  farmer and farm laborers = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0080
LANF Mother tongue :
  French = 1; 0 otherwise 0.2461
LANE Mother tongue :
  English = 1; 0 otherwise 0.7188
LANB Linguistic ability :
  bilingual in French and English = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0138
ONTR Region of residence :
  Ontario = 1; 0 otherwise 0.2223
CAND Country of birth :
  Canada = 1; 0 otherwise 0.8785
MARRD Marital status :
  married = 1; 0 otherwise 0.6323
DIVOR Marital status :
  divorced = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0842
NOREL Religious status :
  no religion = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1127
HEDS Health satisfaction :
  rather or totally displeased = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0673
LTDS Leisure time satisfaction :
  rather or totally displeased = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0769
MSDS Marital status satisfaction :
  rather or totally displeased = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0581
Source : The 1986 General Social Survey-Cycle 2, Statistics Canada.
Table 2
Age-Specific Earnings Functions
Age Groups
Explanatory 15-24 25-34 35-44 45 +
Variables      (1)          (2)   (1)          (2)   (1)          (2)  (1)          (2)a
Constant -3.936 6.024 -4.610 10.14 -11.93 9.719 -4.164 13.60
(2.44) (2.78) (2.15) (2.18) (3.02) (2.63) (3.46) (3.96)
a a a a a a
SEXM 3.800 3.103 7.581 8.844 8.249 10.74 10.19 12.95a
(0.623) (0.669) (0.561) (0.604) (0.829) (0.905) (0.870) (1.03)
a a a a a a a
ED13- -0.222 -0.679 -1.214 -1.531 1.036 2.045 0.400 0.939
(1.69) (1.99) (1.24) (1.39) (1.25) (1.44) (1.07) (1.23)
ED13+ 2.970 4.068 0.800 1.940 3.895 5.262 2.418 4.604
(1.78) (2.07) (1.35) (1.49) (1.40) (1.59) (1.55) (1.68)
a a a a
EDUN 6.478 8.202 5.253 7.265 9.284 14.29 7.800 14.73a
(2.01) (2.32) (1.63) (1.63) (1.79) 1.87) (2.18) (2.18)
a a a a a a a
EXPER 0.829 2.512 1.436 1.919 0.427 0.617 0.185 0.309b
(0.442) (0.484) (0.221) (0.251) (0.224) (0.265) (0.191) (0.263)
a a a b a
EXPER2 0.0159 -0.157 -0.072 -0.0946 -0.0100 -0.0175 -0.0051 -0.0084
(0.074) (0.083) (0.012) (0.0138) (0.0075) (0.0088) (0.0035) (0.0049)
b a a a b
CAND 0.283 0.457 -1.236 -1.097 1.676 1.354 1.440 -0.332
(1.21) (1.46) (1.11) (1.22) (1.09) (1.24) (1.09) (1.27)
JOBWKS 0.234 0.347 0.409 0.337a
(0.021) (0.026) (0.039) (0.047)
a a a
WPART -2.653 -5.358 -7.506 -8.281a
(0.723) (1.01) (1.34) (1.51)
a a a
WSSP 3.980 2.820 8.879 10.79a
(1.03) (1.05) (1.29) (2.23)
a a a
WSTF 2.608 2.374 4.810 4.295a
(0.682) (0.608) (0.892) (0.904)
a a a
LANB -1.848 2.252 2.588 -2.030
(2.24) (2.44) (3.21) (2.45)
ONT 0.759 -1.004 3.363 2.326
(0.710) (0.651) (1.05) (1.10)
a a
MARRD 2.600 0.379 1.342 0.753a
(0.664) (0.616) (1.11) (1.45)
DIVOR 3.749 1.067 0.909 -0.440b
(2.16) (1.24) (1.45) (1.51)
NOREL 0.425 0.920 3.197 2.554
(0.782) (0.903) (1.53) (1.42)
a b
Table 2 - cont’d
Age Groups
Explanatory 15-24 25-34 35-44 45 +
Variables      (1)          (2)   (1)          (2)   (1)          (2)  (1)          (2)a
HEDS -0.670 0.208 0.568 -1.472
(1.17) (1.08) (1.69) (1.36)
LTDS -2.023 0.854 -0.289 -1.348a
(0.791) (1.02) (1.72) (1.54)
R 0.420 0.234 0.382 0.242 0.468 0.287 0.509 0.338&2
N observations 414 414 1 040 1 040 670 670 476 476
Notes : ( ) Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
  Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.b
    The ED08, WSNS and WFFL variables are excluded.
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Table 3
Qualitative Predictions of Various Felt Utility Models
 on Reported Job Satisfaction, and Linear Constraints on the Coefficients
Models ( ( ( ( ( constraints1 2 3 4 5
Statistical (H )            0 0 0 0 00
Economic                          + + 0 0 0 ( = (1 2
SWB :
Relative utility 0 + 0 0 0
Social Comparison (weak) + + 0 0 0 ( > (2  1
Social Comparison (strong) $0 0 + 0 + ( = (3 5
Cognitive dissonance I $0 0 0 0 +
Cognitive dissonance II     $0 + ! 0 + ( = !(3 2
Disappointment-elation $0 + + 0 + ( = (3 5
Loss aversion 0 + + ! ! ( = ( =!(4 5 2
Table 4
Reported Job Satisfaction Level by Age Groups1
Satisfaction Levels
Age Groups
15-24 25-34 35-44 45+
Totally and rather displeased 54 106 47 37
13.04 % 10.19 % 7.01 % 7.77 %
Rather satisfied 197 469 279 176
47.58 % 45.10 % 41.64 % 36.97 %
Fully satisfied 163 465 344 263
39.37 % 44.71 % 51.34 % 55.25 %
Total 414 1 040 670 476
Note :   Number of individuals and percentages, respectively.1
Table 5a
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors) for the Utility and Other Subjective Well-Being Models for the 25-34 Age Group
Models**
Coefficients
y 0 D0 D 0 D 0 Z* Loglkh.^ ^ ^ + ^ - ^
Relative utility 0.01841 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 -961.7575b
(0.0044)
+ - - -
Social comparison 0.01140 0.01839 1 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 -960.5135
(weak form) (0.0071) (0.0044)
a - + - - -
Social comparison 0.01150 0.02839 0.2839 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 -964.2231
(strong form) (0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0084)
b a a + - - -
Cognitive 0.01148 0.2340 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 -966.2201
dissonance I (0.0070) (0.0083)
b a + - - -
Cognitive 0.1143 0.02135 -0.02135 -0.00431 1 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 -960.5473
dissonance II (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0117)
a a - + - - -
Disappointment / 0.01140 0.01854 -0.00037 -0.00037 1 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 -960.5131
elation (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.013) (0.013)
a - + - - -
Loss aversion -0.00584 0.03984 0.00584 0.00584 4 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 -965.9755
(0.0192) (0.0256) (0.0192) (0.0192)
+ + - - -
Notes for Table 5a:   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.b
* Z = 1 : SEXM, 2 : ED13-, 3 : ED13+, 4 : EDUN, 5 : LANF, 6 : LANE, 7 : CAND, 8 : NOREL, 9 : HEDS,
10 : LTDS, 11 : MSDS.  The number indicates the corresponding variable in Z when positively (+) or
negatively (-) significant at the 5 % level.  The loglikelihood for the Z* reference model (the statistical model)
is -971.3756.
** The loglikelihood for the economic model is -960.8649.
The constant " and the threshold parameter *  are significant in all models.  The coefficients of the variable 1
EXPER to account for the heteroskedasticity are negative but insignificant in all models.
Table 5b
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors) for the Utility and Other Subjective Well-Being Models for the 35-44 Age Group
Models**
Coefficients
y 0 D0 D 0 D 0 Z* Loglkh.^ ^ ^ + ^ - ^
Relative utility 0.00755 9 , 10 -578.3899a
(0.00387)
- -
Social comparison 0.00874 0.00827 1 , 9 , 10 -577.2672
(weak form) (0.0058) (0.0041)
a - - -
Social comparison 0.00913 0.01257 0.01257 9 , 10 -578.1774
(strong form) (0.0059) (0.0073) (0.0073)
b b - -
Cognitive 0.00869 0.00759 9 , 10 -579.6303
dissonance I (0.0059) (0.0074)
- -
Cognitive 0.00838 0.01032 -0.01032 -0.00572 1 , 9 , 10 -577.6880
dissonance II (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0114)
b b - - -
Disappointment / 0.00875 0.00818 0.00021 0.00021 1 , 9 , 10 -577.2670
elation (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0119) (0.0119)
- - -
Loss aversion -0.00290 0.02076 0.00290 0.00290 9 , 10 -578.7712
(0.0162) (0.0217) (0.0162) (0.0162)
- -
Notes for Table 5b:   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate..b
* Z = 1 : SEXM, 2 : ED13-, 3 : ED13+, 4 : EDUN, 5 : LANF, 6 : LANE, 7 : CAND, 8 : NOREL, 9 : HEDS,
10 : LTDS, 11 : MSDS.  The number indicates the corresponding variable in Z when positively (+) or
negatively (-) significant at the 5 % level or 10 % level.  The loglikelihood for the Z* reference model (the
statistical model) is -581.0159.
** The loglikelihood for the economic model is -577.2696.
The constant " and the threshold parameter *  are significant in all models.  The coefficients of the variable1
EXPER to account for the heteroskedasticity are negative and significant in all models.
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Table 6
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors) of the 
Posterior Choice Model of Job Satisfaction
Explanatory Age Groups
Variables and
Statistics 15-24 25-34 35-44 45 +
(y  - y )= g 0.01301 0.1138 0.1883 0.1112^ ^ ^2 1 1
(0.0397) (0.0551) (0.0986) (0.0731)
a b
(y  - y )= g -0.00718 0.02235 0.01032 0.00701^ ^ ^3 2 2
(0.0164) (0.0081) (0.00616) (0.0083)
a b
(y  - y )= g 0.01393 0.01795 0.00846 0.006003 3 3^ ^ b
(0.0085) (0.0043) (0.00410) (0.0045)
a a
SEXM 0.01657 0.04269 0.3842 0.3276
(0.109) (0.098) (0.2554) (0.218)
ED13- -0.5126 0.02677 0.3067 0.02545a
(0.249) (0.137) (0.162) (0.109)
b
ED13+ -0.2215 0.1261 0.1730 0.5727
(0.254) (0.151) (0.197) (0.278)
a
EDUN 0.0337 0.3893 1.152 0.8266a
(0.326) (0.171) (0.549) (0.583)
a a
LANF 1.0540 -0.0880 0.3329 0.2272a
(0.405) (0.243) (0.225) (0.224)
LANE 1.0281 -0.1297 0.3067 0.2018a
(0.402) (0.233) (0.215) (0.219)
CAND -0.3207 0.2943 -0.09914 -0.2686
(0.199) (0.135) (0.113) (0.183)
a
NOREL -0.4663 -0.1023 0.1102 -0.3891a
(0.152) (0.104) (0.121) (0.190)
a
HEDS -0.3635 -0.3760 -0.3611 -0.2715
(0.231) (0.139) (0.144) (0.171)
a a
LTDS 0.03275 -0.2597 -0.4365 -0.6534
(0.209) (0.115) (0.139) (0.235)
a a a
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Table 6 - cont’d
Explanatory Age Groups
Variables and
Statistics 15-24 25-34 35-44 45 +
MSDS -0.4890 -0.5645 -0.05579 -0.2368a
(0.216) (0.144) (0.169) (0.154)
a
" 0.8481 1.078 0.4571 0.9143a
(0.414) (0.285) (0.351) (0.295)
a a
* 1.332 1.423 1.202 1.0561 a
(0.134) (0.119) (0.175) (0.257)
a a a
EXPER -0.04385 -0.00371 -0.01416 -0.00894
(0.0284) (0.002) (0.0082) (0.00740)
b
Loglikelihood -385.8752 -956.7874 -574.8731 -401.2447
N observations 414 1 040 670 476
Notes :   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) a
when appropriate.
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) b
when appropriate.
Table 7
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors) of the Lifetime Utility Model of Job Satisfaction
Explanatory Variables Age Group
and Statistics
15-24 25-34 35-44 45+
y -0.02055 -0.2955 -0.2037 -0.9338^1
(0.0629) (0.427) (0.107) (1.29)
b
y 0.03474 0.3373 0.2150 1.426^2
(0.101) (0.576) (0.130) (2.07)
b
y -0.02119 0.004379 0.00203 0.00091^3
(0.0188) (0.0089) (0.0071) (0.0084)
y 0.01396 0.01782 0.00873 0.005733
(0.00867) (0.00427) (0.0043) (0.0043)
a a
Loglikelihood -385.8616 -956.6946 -574.7736 -401.1967
Notes :   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.b
The variables that are significant in the Z vector are generally the same as those reported in Table 6.  The threshold
parameter *  is  significant in each age-group. The coefficient of the variable EXPER to account for the1
heteroskedasticity is negative but insignificant in each age-group.
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